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PRIVATE JURIES WITHIN THE 
ARBITRATION FRAMEWORK:  
A THIRD PATH IN DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
By: Lionel M. Schooler1 & Luke Gilman2 
 
I. ABSTRACT  
In the context of a global pandemic and a resulting 
backlog of jury trials in the United States court system, this 
article explores the potential for employing a private jury 
system within existing arbitration law to provide a third path 
for parties seeking an expedient resolution of disputes by 
juries when impediments exist to jury trial in court.  After an 
introduction and background on the current state of the 
global SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and its effect on court 
backlogs, we outline the law applicable to private jury 
proceedings, including (a) whether an arbitral award 
predicated on a private jury determination is enforceable; 
and (b) the requirements and limitations of a private jury 
award.  We then conclude with a brief analysis of the 
considerations that parties seeking to employ private jury 
proceedings might implement to ensure such proceedings 
lead to a full and fair hearing and an enforceable award.  
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
The global SARS-CoV-2 pandemic necessitated 
court closures across the country, triggering a significant 
 
1 Senior Partner, Jackson Walker LLP, Houston, Texas. 
2 Partner, Jackson Walker LLP, Houston, Texas. 
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backlog of cases.3  This phenomenon potentially poses a 
significant obstacle to timely jury trials.  Other 
commentators have astutely noted that arbitration offers a 
flexibility that permits parties to resolve disputes without the 
need for courts to fully reopen and clear their backlog.  
But what of the litigants who don’t wish to discard 
their right to a jury trial merely for the sake of expediency?  
In contrast with jury trial or arbitration as the only dispute 
resolution alternatives, this article offers a third, hybrid path 
for willing parties: private jury trials in arbitration.  While 
use of such a process is exceedingly rare, there is at least 
some precedent for conducting jury trials within the legal 
framework of arbitration.  
We first analyze the boundaries of arbitration law 
and find there is ample flexibility therein for parties to agree 
to conduct a private jury proceeding.  We consider next the 
logistics of such a procedure.  We then turn to questions of 
enforceability and suggest that the role of the arbitrator 
should be similar to that of a judge in a traditional jury trial, 
that is, assessing the findings and accordingly translating a 
private jury’s findings as applicable into an enforceable 
arbitration award in the same way that a judge translates a 
jury's sustainable answers to a jury charge into an 
enforceable judgment.  Finally, we analyze some of the 
requirements and limitations of jury awards.  
The demand for private jury proceedings in the 
absence of a global pandemic or a significant backlog in the 
court system may be relatively small, but we nevertheless 
consider it worthwhile to provide a means of establishing 
enforceable awards through private jury service when the 
need arises.  Arbitration theoretically offers parties the 
opportunity to craft such specialized and unique dispute 
resolution procedures; however, in practice, practitioners’ 
 
3 Al Tompkins, COVID-19 shutdowns are creating court backlogs across the 
U.S., POYNTER.ORG (May 6, 2020), https://www.poynter.org/reporting-edit-
ing/2020/covid-19-shutdowns-are-creating-court-backlogs-across-the-u-s/. 
2
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arbitration clauses rarely vary in the type of alternative 
proceeding utilized.4  Finally, in advocating a radically 
different type of arbitration process from what is typical, we 
suggest that contractual counterparties might consider a 




In the Spring of 2020, during the midst of the Coro-
navirus epidemic, courthouses across the United States be-
gan shutting their doors to all but the most urgent matters.5  
Many courts quickly adopted capabilities to facilitate re-
motely addressing certain qualifying matters, but determin-
ing the merits of a dispute without requiring jury trial waiver 
remained an intractable obstacle.6  
Some courts have proven admirably inventive, tem-
porarily decamping from the courtroom to resume jury trials 
in buildings such as high school gymnasia and convention 
center spaces to comply with recommended social distanc-
ing and other safety precautions to ensure a juror does not 
undertake an extraordinary risk simply by performing his or 
her civic duties as a juror.7  Other courts have experimented 
 
4 See Daniel T. Pascucci, Dissecting Common Basic Arbitration Clauses -- You 
Can Build a Better One, MINTZ (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2196/2018-03-dissecting-
common-basic-arbitration-clauses-you-can-build. 
5 See e.g., Matt Hamilton & James Queally, Coronavirus: All California trials 
delayed; L.A. County courts close to the public, LA TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-03-23/coronavirus-california-
delays-trials-la-county-shuts-courts-to-public. 
6 Maggie Jo Buchanan, The Pressing Need To Support Courts During the Coro-
navirus Crisis, AMERICAN PROGRESS (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.american-
progress.org/issues/courts/news/2020/04/07/482712/pressing-need-support-
courts-coronavirus-crisis/. 
7 Blaine Corren, Jury Service Begins for Trials Delayed by COVID-19 Pan-
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with remote summary jury trials, with promising results.8  
However, thus far, courts do not appear able to undertake 
these extraordinary measures at a sufficient scale to permit 
such relocated jury trials as a matter of routine for all of the 
litigants who might otherwise avail themselves of that right.  
In the meantime, a considerable backlog of cases awaiting 
trial appears to be developing.9 
A number of courts have offered remote bench trials 
with some apparent success.10  Most courts have offered 
bench trials as an option to litigants to expedite the time in 
which their trial can be heard.11  Yet this can hardly be hailed 
as a solution, given that it compels a litigant’s forfeiting trial 
before a jury of his or her peers as the cost of escaping fur-
ther delay.12 
Of course, pre- or post-dispute arbitration is another 
alternative available to litigants willing to agree to it.  Even 
so, as traditionally practiced, arbitration bears many of the 
 
8 Mark Paladino & David Zaslow, Virtual Jury Trials: The Next Wave of Re-
mote Legal Practice, JD SUPRA (June 5, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legal-
news/virtual-jury-trials-the-next-wave-of-29445/. 
9 E.g., Chris Crook, Courts Battling COVID-19 Backlog, ZANESVILLE TIMES 
RECORDER (July 11, 2020), https://www.zanesvil-
letimesrecorder.com/story/news/local/2020/07/11/courts-battling-case-back-
log-due-covid-19-pandemic/3258903001/. 
10 See generally Jennifer Lapinski, Robert Hirschhorn &  Lisa Blue, Zoom Jury 
Trials: The Idea Vastly Exceeds the Technology, LAW.COM (Sept. 29, 2020), 
https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2020/09/29/zoom-jury-trials-the-idea-
vastly-exceeds-the-technology/. 
11 See Lauren Ernde, Pandemic Forces Courts and Lawyers to Reimagine Pro-
ceedings, THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF SAN FRANCISCO (Dec. 15, 2020), 
https://www.sfbar.org/blog/pandemic-forces-courts-and-lawyers-to-reimag-
ine-proceedings/. 
12 Jessica A. Roth, The Constitution Is On Pause in America’s Courtrooms, THE 
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same limitations as a bench trial, coupled with some addi-
tional, perceived, limitations such as limited rights of appeal 
or review.13  
Taking all of these factors into account, extraordi-
nary conditions may impel the use of extraordinary proce-
dures.  For many litigants, waiting for a jury trial is not a 
realistic or tolerable solution.14  Justice delayed may very 
well be justice denied.  While many judges have offered the 
option of bench trials as a quicker resolution method on a 
compressed schedule, this method sacrifices jury involve-
ment for rapidity, and still carries with it the challenge to a 
litigant to weave in and out of the court’s regular docket.15  
Indeed, it has to be recognized that significant delays may 
attend even this compromise approach, given that the sched-
uling of any bench trial depends upon a judge's availability 
in a time of overtaxed resources. 
The concept of a private jury trial, conducted by an 
arbitrator (or arbitration panel) in roughly the same manner 
as a court would,16 but under the auspices of an arbitration, 
 
13 For the pros and cons of ADR, see generally Matt Hoffman, The Advantages 
and Disadvantages of Arbitration vs. Court Litigation, TUCKER LAW (Feb. 13, 
2015), https://www.tuckerlaw.com/2015/02/13/advantages-disadvantages-ar-
bitration-vs-court-litigation/. 
14 Rick Ellsley, Can’t Get a Civil Jury Trial Due to COVID-Related Court Clo-
sures? Try Arbitration, DAILY BUSINES REVIEW (Dec. 22, 2020), 
https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2020/12/22/cant-get-a-civil-jury-
trial-due-to-covid-related-court-closures-try-arbitration/. 
15 Jack Karp, Trial Alternatives Getting Fresh Look With COVID-19 Backlog, 
LAW360 (Feb. 4, 2020). https://www.law360.com/pulse/daily-litigation/arti-
cles/1351450/trial-alternatives-getting-fresh-look-with-covid-19-backlog. 
16 There is a tradition in arbitration practice for the parties to have either a sole 
arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators; see AAA Comm. Rule R–16 (“[i]f the 
arbitration agreement does not specify the number of arbitrators, the dispute 
shall be heard and determined by one arbitrator, unless the AAA, in its discre-
tion, directs that three arbitrators be appointed”); Dockser v. Schwartzberg, 433 
F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that where American Arbitration Asso-
ciation determined that a proceeding should be heard by three arbitrators instead 
of one arbitrator according to its rules, that was a procedural question to be 
answered exclusively in that forum).  Presumably a party seeking to employ a 
private jury proceeding might also be expected to adopt the traditional relation-
ship of a single arbitrator as it would a single judge.  However, nothing but 
5
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may be relatively novel.17  As far as we can tell, no court has 
yet weighed in on the idea of a private jury in this particular 
context.  In fact, one of the few references we located in pub-
lished case law is a comment by the late Justice Scalia in the 
seminal arbitration case AT&T v. Concepcion, who posited 
proceedings by “a panel of twelve lay arbitrators” as a fan-
ciful retort, without opining on the enforceability of such a 
panel.18  
However, we are aware of at least one instance 
where a private jury trial was tried in practice, conducted by 
retired federal judge Vaughn Walker and reported in a 2015 
article by the Judge and counsel in the case.19  The authors 
of the article in which that proceeding is discussed appear to 
have considered use of that process a success.20  
 
IV. WHAT LAW APPLIES TO PRIVATE JURY PRO-
CEEDINGS?   
Arbitration is a creature of contract given special 
recognition by statute.21  Arbitrations in the United States 
 
tradition and experience compel this approach.  If a party adopts the view that 
having more than one arbitrator improves the quality of the process by increas-
ing the deliberative capability of the panel, that party may seek agreement that 
three arbitrators hear the case in addition to a private jury.  On the other hand, 
where a private jury undertakes the fact-finding role traditional to a jury, this 
would permit the arbitrator to focus on legal issues, reducing the overall burden 
of the arbitrator’s role.  A sole arbitrator is likely more expedient and cost-ef-
fective in this context, but a panel could be employed if desired by the parties. 
17 Robert A. Patterson, Reviving the Civil Jury Trial: Implementing Short, Sum-
mary, and Expedited Trial Programs, 2014 BYU L. REV. 4, 951, 965 (2015). 
18 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011). 
19 Hon. Vaughn R. Walker, David C. Wheeler & Roy J. Jimenez, The Private 
Jury Trial of A Business Case, Litigation 5, 6 (2015); Roy J. Jimenez, How a 
Private Jury Trial Worked for My Client, 37-MAY L.A. LAW. 44 (May 2014). 
20 Walker, et. al, supra note 19.  
21 See Hamish Lal et.al, The Law of an Arbitration Agreement: Is it the of the 
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involving some measure of interstate commerce or when ex-
plicitly so indicated by the contracting parties are governed 
by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),22 with certain limited 
exceptions.23  Additionally, each state has its own state arbi-
tration legislation which separately governs agreements to 
arbitrate subject to its own jurisdiction.24  To the extent that 
any state’s arbitration law conflicts with either the express 
provisions of the FAA or its intent in promoting arbitration, 
the FAA preempts such a law.25   
Courts applying the FAA have restricted their re-
view of the procedural mechanisms that the parties agree to 
employ in an arbitral setting to the question of whether the 
dispute is within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate and 
whether the parties have agreed, expressly or implicitly, to 
adopt a particular set of rules by reference.26   
Accordingly, from the perspective of the courts 
when reviewing arbitral awards, the procedures and eviden-
tiary rules in arbitration are matters for the arbitrators to de-
termine within the boundaries of the applicable arbitration 
 
22 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. 
23 9 U.S.C. § 1; see New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537 (2019).  
24 ROTH ET AL., 1 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE GUIDE § 2:11 
app. II-2 (listing state arbitration statutes). 
25 Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P'ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1424–29 (2017). 
26 John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 556–58 (1964) ("Once it is 
determined . . . that the parties are obligated to submit the subject matter of a 
dispute to arbitration, ‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and 
bear on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator.”); Prudential Sec., 
Inc. v. Shoemaker, 981 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. App. 1st 1998) (holding that 
there was no basis to find that an arbitration panel exceeded its authority by 
awarding punitive damages where the appellant did not put into evidence the 
arbitration agreement on which the scope of the panel's authority was based); 
13D CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3569 (3d ed. 2020) (quoting Sirotzky v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 347 
F.3d 985, 990 (7th Cir. 2003), abrogated by Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 
U.S. 132 (2005)) ("Outside ‘the most distant of outer bounds,’ such as the use 
of undue means to procure an arbitration award, the Federal Arbitration Act 
does not regulate arbitration procedure"). 
7
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contract, rather than for a court to impose.27  Under this ru-
bric, there is no per se prohibition on the use of a private jury 
in arbitral proceedings.  Courts have generally held to the 
jurisprudential principle that whatever is not prohibited by 
law is permitted.28  In keeping with the general purposes of 
the FAA, as interpreted by the courts since its enactment, as 
long as a valid agreement to arbitrate has been found, there 
is very little to constrain the imagination of the parties in 
mutually selecting the procedure deemed best able to address 
their particular dispute, even if such a procedure is use of a 
private jury of their peers for fact-finding purposes.   
 
A.   ARE ARBITRAL AWARDS PREDICATED ON PRI-
VATE DETERMINATIONS ENFORCEABLE? 
Section 2 of the FAA broadly provides for the en-
forceability of any written provision in a contract “evidenc-
ing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration 
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract,”29 and 
Section 9 provides for the confirmation of the resulting 
award and entry of a judgment on that basis.30  The FAA 
contains no other formal requirements addressing the nature 
of the proceeding itself in keeping with the concept of arbi-
tration as a creature of contract.31  Thus, the enforceability 
of the determinations of a private jury proceeding turn on 
whether such a proceeding is an “arbitration” within the 
 
27 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57–58 (1995); 
Vigortone AG Products, Inc. v. PM AG Prods., Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 647 (7th 
Cir. 2002); P & P Indus., Inc. v. Sutter Corp., 179 F.3d 861, 867–68 (10th Cir. 
1999); Sirotzky, 347 F.3d at 990. 
28 Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948).  
29 9 U.S.C.A. § 2. 
30 9 U.S.C.A. § 9. 
31 Justice Brennan appears to have introduced the memorable phrase into the 
jurisprudence of arbitration in his concurrence in United Steelworkers of Am. 
v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960).  The Supreme Court has also rec-
ognized that the contractual autonomy of the parties is not unlimited; see Hall 
St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (holding that simply 
because “arbitration is a creature of contract” the FAA does not permit parties 
to expand judicial review once the arbitration is completed). 
8
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scope of the FAA, and whether the resulting determination 
by the arbitrator based upon the jury’s determinations is an 
“award.”32 
Courts have wrestled with whether or not appraisal 
proceedings constitute an arbitration within the scope of the 
FAA, concluding at various times that an insurance appraisal 
which only determines the scope of a loss is not an arbitra-
tion,33 and that a series of appraisals to determine a business 
valuation that would only fix the purchase price under cer-
tain circumstances and would not necessarily settle a dispute 
between the parties was not an arbitration.34  However, an 
appraisal of a company’s valuation could constitute an arbi-
tration where it fell within the scope of the definition of “ar-
bitration” under the applicable state statutory definition.35  
The essence of these existential determinations is not, how-
ever, the form that such a proceeding takes, but whether or 
not such a proceeding results in a final adjudication of the 
dispute.36  Courts have emphasized the relative autonomy 
parties enjoy in fashioning an adjudicative process—“[p]art-
ies need not establish quasi-judicial proceedings resolving 
their disputes to gain the protections of the FAA, but may 
choose from a broad range of procedures and tailor arbitra-
 
32  9 U.S.C.A. § 2. 
33 Hartford Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Teachworth, 898 F.2d 1058, 1062 (5th Cir. 1990).  
34 Salt Lake Trib. Publ'g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 689–90 
(10th Cir. 2004). 
35 Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th Cir. 1987) (con-
cluding that appraisal of assets fell within scope of California’s statutory defi-
nition of “arbitration” where that definition included “valuations, appraisals and 
similar proceedings”). 
36 Salt Lake Trib. Publ'g Co., 390 F.3d at 689–90 (“Central to any conception 
of classic arbitration is that the disputants empowered a third party to render a 
decision settling their dispute”); Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 
350 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that “the essence of arbitration” is that parties 
“agreed to arbitrate [their] disputes through to completion, i.e. to an award made 
by a third-party arbitrator”). 
9
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tion to suit their peculiar circumstances”—but it must be ad-
judicative and countenance that third party’s decision to set-
tle the dispute.37 
For that reason, courts have generally rejected at-
tempts to enshrine the traditional and oft-cited advantages of 
arbitration as cheaper, faster, and better than litigation.38  
Generally, courts have not recognized these advantages as 
anything more than aspirational goals.39  
In fact, a number of courts have upheld the arbitra-
tion of disputes that would otherwise be beyond the court’s 
power to decide.40  For example, while the First Amend-
ment's Free Exercise Clause constrains the judiciary from 
applying faith-based doctrine in cases before it, a court can 
compel religious tribunals to arbitrate many claims if the 
 
37 Salt Lake Trib. Publ’g Co., 390 F.3d at 690. 
38 Recent empirical studies tend to support the view that the arbitration process 
is generally substantially faster than the formal litigation process; also, the fee 
structure for certain types of cases such as plaintiff employment claims is often 
substantially cheaper to the initiating party as the costs in that kind of proceed-
ing are borne by the employer under the rules of many arbitral institutions; see 
Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from 
Four Providers, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3238460; 
Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from 
Four Providers, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1, 60 (2019).  
39 DeRose v. Jason Robert's, Inc., 216 A.3d 699, 716 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019), 
cert. denied, 218 A.3d 593 (2019) (holding that if parties wish to have their 
disputes resolved through arbitration within a particular time frame, they are 
free to do so contractually, but there is no established public policy rendering a 
protracted arbitration proceeding invalid). 
40 Sperry Int’l. Trade, Inc. v. Gov't of Isr., 689 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1982) 
("[A] court may not vacate an award because the arbitrator has exceeded the 
power the court would have, or would have had if the parties had chosen to 
litigate, rather than to arbitrate the dispute.  Those who have chosen arbitration 
as their forum should recognize that arbitration procedures and awards often 
differ from what may be expected in courts of law.").  
 
10
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parties have privately contracted for arbitration.41  As a re-
sult, courts have long interpreted the FAA to permit awards 
by religious tribunals.42  
On the whole, we think that a private jury, which in 
fact falls on the more quasi-judicial end of the spectrum of 
permissible procedural options, dwells well within the exist-
ing definition of “arbitration” subject to and enforceable un-
der the FAA.  A private jury would readily survive a chal-
lenge on the ground that it bore too little resemblance to tra-
ditional arbitration, though, as noted above, no court appears 
to have considered such a challenge.    
 
B.   WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITA-
TIONS OF PRIVATE JURY AWARDS? 
 To be clear, the relative procedural autonomy that 
the FAA provides to arbitration proceedings does not con-
note the absence of limitations.43  Indeed, the FAA author-
izes grounds to vacate an award on substantive or procedural 
grounds: 
(a)  In any of the following cases the United 
States court in and for the district wherein 
the award was made may make an order va-
cating the award upon the application of 
any party to the arbitration— 
(1) where the award was procured by 
 
41 1 THOMAS OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 18:12 (2020).  
42 See e.g., Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 162, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming 
an award by a “Bet Din” tribunal governed by "Halachic" or Jewish law); 
Meisels v. Uhr, 593 N.E.2d 1359, 1364 (N.Y. 1992) ("Whether or not the panel 
was specifically granted peshara authority, the arbitration agreements were 
broad enough to encompass disputes concerning title to the properties owned 
by the partnership—in fact, the first arbitration agreement specifically identi-
fied those buildings as subjects of the arbitration"); Ghertner v. Solaimani,  563 
S.E.2d 878, 880 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) ("[T]he results of a Bet Din, conducted 
pursuant to the Georgia Arbitration Act, are enforceable pursuant to that Act.  
This conclusion is supported by decisions of courts of sister states which have 
considered the specific issue of a Bet Din."). 
43  9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.   
11
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 corruption, fraud, or undue means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality 
or corruption in the arbitrators, or 
either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty 
of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing, upon sufficient 
cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to 
the controversy; or of any other 
misbehavior by which the rights of 
any party have been prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded 
their powers, or so imperfectly ex-
ecuted them that a mutual, final, 
and definite award upon the sub-
ject matter submitted was not 
made.44  
As a result, a private jury trial conducted within the 
framework of an arbitration must meet the same standards as 
an arbitration before a panel to yield an enforceable award.  
Similarly, a valid arbitration clause must, at mini-
mum, employ procedures that allow each party to present its 
case.45  This statutory requirement would remain in force 
whether or not the parties chose to employ a private jury in 
their proceeding.46  
 
44  9 U.S.C. § 10(a). 
45 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3); Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 
1997) (vacating award where arbitrators refused to continue hearing to permit 
testimony by company's official and record did not support arbitrators’ finding 
that a company official’s testimony would have been cumulative). 
46 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). 
12
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The Supreme Court has held that “§§ 10 and 11 re-
spectively provide the FAA's exclusive grounds for expe-
dited vacatur and modification.”47  
Thus, although some courts have justified greater 
deference to an arbitrator’s decision on the basis that the par-
ties bargained for a theoretically informal, speedy, and inex-
pensive process in arbitration,48 that oft-cited policy justifi-
cation for arbitration is not in any way a substantive bar to 
the parties’ exercising their autonomy by choosing any pro-
ceeding they may see fit to employ, so long as it meets the 
basic requirements of the FAA.49 
It must be recognized that the FAA’s wording trig-
gers a textual issue: it contains no language expressly pro-
hibiting private juries as fact finders, but neither does it pro-
vide for private juries.50  Indeed, the FAA clearly contem-
plates that the obligations of decision-making in an arbitra-
tion will be made by arbitrators.51   
 
47 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008); see 
Davis v. Producers Agr. Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1555 (2015) (stating that arbitrators' awards “will be vacated 
only in certain narrow circumstances defined in the statutes”); Parker v. ETB 
Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 15-11128, 2016 WL 4151216, at 1 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2016) 
(“[W]e may only vacate an award when it violates one of four grounds specified 
in the Federal Arbitration Act.”).  
48 Matter of Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. (Marc Rich & Co., A.G.), 579 
F.2d 691, 701 (2d Cir. 1978) (opining that “even greater caution is justified 
when the decision to be set aside is the product of the theoretically informal, 
speedy, and inexpensive process of arbitration, freely chosen by the parties”). 
49 In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 42 F.3d 870, 875 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that 
“there is no common law of arbitration”); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trus-
tees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 469, 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1250, 
103 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1989) (“[a]rbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, 
not coercion, and the parties are generally free to structure their arbitration 
agreements as they see fit”). 
50 9 U.S.C. §§ 10–11.  
51 In this regard, we suggest that the arbitrator, or a panel, would possess the 
authority given to judges under FED. R. CIV. P. 50 to evaluate whether a partic-
ular factual matter merits jury consideration or, put another way, whether the 
panel would possess the authority to declare a “judgment as a matter of law.” 
We address this concept further at the end of this section. 
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One solution is to consider whether each of the in-
dividual members of a prospective private jury would act as 
an arbitrator under the FAA.  Here, one might be tempted to 
resort to Justice Scalia's whimsical conception of “a panel of 
twelve lay arbitrators” in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion.52  It is worth noting that federal courts have been will-
ing to consider, and confirm, awards issued by panels com-
prised of groups larger than some juries.53  In addition, a 
number of courts have been willing to consider arbitral 
awards issued by individuals who were neither lawyers nor 
experienced arbitrators.54  In fact, there is a long history of 
non-lawyers presiding as arbitrators, particularly when the 
subject matter has required specific professional occupa-
tional expertise such as engineering or accountancy, in 
which such expertise is elevated in importance above legal 
training or prior experience.55  We note that the arbitration’s 
dictionary definition is likely broad enough to even include 
“a panel of twelve lay arbitrators.”56  Black’s Law Diction-
ary defines "arbitration" as a "dispute-resolution process in 
 
52 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011). 
53 See Soaring Wind Energy, L.L.C. v. Catic USA Inc., 946 F.3d 742, 756 (5th 
Cir. 2020) (affirming an award issued by nine arbitrators, noting that the plain 
language of the arbitration agreement would permit each of the ten members of 
the joint venture to name an arbitrator, up to eleven under a clause intended to 
ensure an odd number of arbitrators on the panel). 
54 It is now well established that, though most arbitrators are in fact lawyers, 
there is no legal requirement that an arbitrator be a licensed attorney to serve as 
an arbitrator. See Domke on Commercial Arbitration, § 25:6 (Feb. 2020) (“Le-
gal training is helpful, but an arbitrator need not necessarily be a lawyer.”); 
Kirby v. Grand Crowne Travel Network, LLC, 229 S.W.3d 253, 255 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2007); Ames v. Garfinkel, 11 Misc. 3d 1051(A), 814 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Sup. 
Ct. 2006) (“[a]s arbitrators need not be judges or even lawyers, the failure of a 
party to present the rule of law explicitly to the arbitrators forecloses such party 
from claiming that the arbitrators have “manifestly disregarded” it.”); Kintzele 
v. J.B. & Sons, Inc., 658 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (drawing 
distinction between legal and potentially intended use of term “punitive” on the 
basis that “arbitrators are generally businessmen chosen for their expertise in 
the particular subject matter of the suit . . . who need not be lawyers”). 
55 Kintzele v. J.B. & Sons, Inc., 658 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
56 Arbitration, Bryan A Garner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Thomson West, 
10th ed, 2014). 
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which the disputing parties choose one or more neutral third 
parties to make a final and binding decision resolving the 
dispute.”57  As described above, the courts which have con-
sidered the variety of permissible arbitration procedures 
have focused primarily on whether or not the mechanism 
chosen will result in a final adjudication within the guard-
rails of Section 10(a) of the FAA.58 
However, we think the better practice is for the role 
of an arbitrator and a private jury to operate in distinct 
spheres, mirroring the use of juries in court cases, for reasons 
we describe below.  A party seeking trial before a jury is 
typically seeking a process involving his peers rather than 
the mere multiplying of the size of the panel with its at-
tendant-increased costs.59  While no legal training is neces-
sary for a juror to act as a peer and provide the benefit of his 
life experience, judgment and attention to assessing credibil-
ity of witnesses and making determinations of fact (the role 
of the arbitrator as the FAA contemplates it) does require 
some legal knowledge in order to render an enforceable 
 
57 Arbitration, Bryan A Garner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Thomson West, 
10th ed, 2014). 
58 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008); see 
Davis v. Producers Agr. Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1555 (2015); Parker v. ETB Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 15-11128, 
2016 WL 4151216, at 1 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2016). 
59 Jurors in federal court are paid $50 a day for both Petit Jury and Grand Jury 
service. 28 U.S.C. § 1871 (“A juror shall be paid an attendance fee of $50 per 
day for actual attendance at the place of trial or hearing” in addition to other 
discretionary fees based on length of service). However, this is below the 
$58.00 per day a person would be paid for an eight-hour day at the federal min-
imum wage of $7.25.  The national mean hourly wage as of the 2018 was 
$24.98.  An eight-hour day at the national mean hourly wage would yield 
$199.84 per day.  While the prevailing market for prospective jurors may vary 
across locales, we suggest that $200 per day may be a baseline expectation for 
a jury fee that could attract a cross-section of private jurors and be sufficient to 
encourage active participation; Lance T. Marshall, What Does it Mean to Have 
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award.60  To require this of a panel of “peer” jurors likely 
invites potentially costly mistakes that may rise to the level 
of requiring vacatur of the award. 
On the other hand, if an arbitrator dismisses, 
contradicts, or ignores a jury’s findings, the whole point of 
employing a private jury in the first place may be called into 
question.  The appropriate standard for resolving a 
distinction between jury determinations and arbitrator 
discretion properly to translate such determinations into a 
just and enforceable award may be found in Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure Rule 50 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 50), the federal 
court’s procedural tool establishing the standard for 
judgment as a matter of law in a jury trial.61  This failsafe 
process is appropriate to ensure that the private jury trial 
concept retains its essential function as a dispute resolution 
mechanism, rather than a dispute creation mechanism, by 
permitting a split of opinion or authority among the legal 
and/or fact finders without determining which opinion will 
prevail in the award.  To this end, it is suggested that the 
arbitrator or panel is in the best position to ultimately 
determine, in accordance with the adopted procedures, 
whether and to what extent the jury’s findings can be 
incorporated into an award. 
 
V. HOW SHOULD PRIVATE JURY PROCEEDINGS 
WORK? 
Assuming the parties agree that their dispute should 
be resolved by a private jury along the lines, there remains 
the question of how such proceedings should work. 
As aforementioned, the foundation for utilizing a 
private jury in an arbitration proceeding derives from the 
agreement of the parties.62  Thus, the parties should 
 
60 U.S. Arbitration Act “FAA” 43 Stat. 883 (1925) codified at 9 U.S.C.  Ch. 1. 
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 50.  
62 See Salt Lake Trib. Publ'g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 690 
(10th Cir. 2004). 
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anticipate various procedural issues and address these to the 
extent possible in their agreement.  These issues could 
include: 
(a) the size of the proposed jury; 
(b) the method for selecting such a jury; 
(c) the method for compensating the service 
provided by such a jury;  
(d) the agreement for jurors to sign (covering 
such matters as confidentiality of the 
proceedings); and 
(e) the process by which to instruct the jury as 
to applicable legal principles governing its 
deliberations.   
To ensure efficacious use of private juries, the 
parties may also want to consider any streamlining 
techniques to ensure the best possible use of the jurors’ 
time.63 
Further, the parties need to consider the extent to 
which the jury’s role as factfinder will stand inviolate or, as 
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, be subject to review by the arbitrator 
under certain well-established principles.64  If a Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 50 standard is adopted, and a proper challenge is timely 
lodged to the eligibility of an evidentiary matter to be 
submitted to the jury, then it is anticipated that the arbitrator 
would assess the impact of the jury’s factual determinations 
upon a final award. 
For example, in most arbitrations, arbitrators do not 
strictly enforce any rules of evidence in terms of permitting 
 
63 Consideration must be given to the manner in which private jurors are se-
lected.  With most arbitration service providers, arbitrators as neutrals are re-
quired to make timely disclosures about their existing or potential relationships 
with parties and witnesses.  ETHICS STANDARDS FOR NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS 
IN CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION NO. 7.  Therefore, the parties would need to 
ensure that the identity of selected jurors is made known to an arbitrator before 
starting a hearing to ensure the disclosure process is appropriately enabled. 
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
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or not permitting a party to present evidence.65  A judge must 
hear and review evidence in order to determine its admissi-
bility.66  It makes little practical sense for an arbitrator to re-
view evidence in order to determine whether or not they 
themselves can then consider it as evidence on the merits of 
the case.  This is not so with a jury.  While on the one hand, 
it might seem expedient to the parties to employ rules of ev-
idence in the same way that a court would, we think this is 
another example in which the parties might choose a third 
path and opt for a complete presentation of the entire case 
before the jury panel, giving it an opportunity to deliberate 
and reach a decision, but reserving to the arbitrator the right 
to entertain, if properly raised, challenges to the jury findings 
on the basis of Rule 50 standards.  The arbitrator could either 
announce a ruling at the time of the objection or incorporate 
a ruling on any Rule 50 motions into the award.  
With these procedures in hand, the parties can then 
confer with the arbitrator at the outset of the proceeding, as 
is now done with “preliminary management conferences” 
and the like, to decide other procedural questions, such as: 
(a) opening and closing statements; (b) examination of wit-
nesses; (c) applicable evidentiary standards; and (d) use of 
exhibits, including demonstratives.  
Once these procedures have been agreed to and me-
morialized in an appropriate Scheduling or Procedural Order 
along with other typical scheduling matters, such as discov-
ery deadlines and the like, the parties should have at their 
disposal the appropriate road map to prepare the case for the 
hearing.  
 
65 Best Practices Regarding Evidence in Arbitrations, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF 




66 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated above, the use of a private jury 
within the context of an arbitration proceeding is a workable 
and enforceable procedural mechanism that provides a po-
tentially useful option for parties voluntarily agreeing to em-
ploy it.  For many litigants, the opportunity to have one’s 
case heard by a jury of one’s peers represents an essential 
feature of the American civil justice system.67  At the same 
time, arbitration often provides flexibility and expediency to 
litigants, particularly at times when the court system faces 
significant backlogs and delays in conducting jury trials.  
This analysis demonstrates that litigants can have their jury 
and arbitrate too, using the flexibility of arbitration to craft 
an evidentiary procedure that incorporates the use of a jury 
charged with performing its quintessential fact-finding role.  
Such a proceeding is not for the faint of heart.  The 
parties must first agree to utilize a private jury.  Then, they 
must agree upon how to use such a jury and upon what pro-
cedures apply. Here, the court system provides a model and 
a reference point.  Some might say this is merely litigation 
by another name.  Indeed, it can be.  Yet, it need not be so 
limited.  The parties are free to craft the structure of their 
proceeding and may adopt the process outlined herein or go 
further.  Private juries are simply one of many different tools 
in the toolbox of arbitration.  However, as the SARS-CoV-2 
pandemic threatens the availability of timely jury trials on an 
unprecedented scale, arbitration offers an alternative venue 
for both parties seeking to employ juries to resolve their dis-
putes, and the juries to do so.68 
 
 
67 Mark Chalos, Why fair trials are important to the American legal system, 
TENNESSEAN (Jan. 18, 2020 6:00 AM) 
https://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/2020/01/18/fair-trials-key-
american-legal-system-impeachment-donald-trump/4433403002/. 
68 Courts Suspending Jury Trials as COVID-19 Cases Surge, UNITED STATES 
COURTS, (Nov. 20, 2020) https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/11/20/courts-
suspending-jury-trials-covid-19-cases-surge. 
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